Friday, November 25, 2016

Pal Miner Read A Cent!!!



Shall I dense the dancing of Times in the Ages of Moons on the Suns of tune,
shard of note to the Corn of stock is the Watering whole as the Strong Find,
shipping lane to thought of the Egyptian chisel as I stood to Wall,
the hammer with each tap to grace the clay sand to write a Stood,
thorough to the Sphere oh what the Universe to sing Cosmic grains??,
no this is the Truth by the Compass of lives lived as the Breeze in it the Gentle expression of grass sway!!

Sheep on the Mountain as the storm ran to told,
striding through Orion's Belt way to path of earth,
wise is the memory of Words,
standing on to forward Trues,
compass of ships that wrote to say to Brave,
eagles floor is the majesty of delight from the breadth of life!!

Creation found flight as Evolution I truss to the Roof topped??,
never in the Infinite!!

Ever-lasting are the cent to that Copper Teak,
jade and the gold grains that flow,
such hands in the now of rice must only calendar a sought to this Tremendous Sight,
how that is the brilliance of harness to a bit bridle changed,
height for my mind to glee is the feeling of breast on the Vest of Mankind,
climbing the Vast in a Vista of LAND!!

May the famine of speech to the aggrieved by sound to question of apathetic sorting of filing shore,
as the teach came with Ancient scene,
eyes that brought to that collection simplicity to threshold stored,
in my method of wheat as the fashion of address,
so much on my memorized stature to love the day with just said!!

Heave not humanity as the cold is nor chore to the frozen Ton.draw,
for life is expressed with each price at the footprints tile of spine,
every ankle of leg to the girth of why is the tide on the waves,
be further than no moment as that is the gift of a Redwood to the standard of Grove,
it is the measure of ole tied full,
vernacular to the type shine with grin smiling the shin!!

Hard Tales to dial,
however it is the shale speaking through,
with dust there is the sky,
while the scramble may felt to only a rub it is the Trees that ring mastery to memoire,
hymns that swam to sing belief!!

Good Mourning America, Is Thigh Cross Sect^Shin Burn^Kneeing Or Lighting The Dust^did Tore^Itch??



This World rhind is on the bowel of toy's and Razor's to shovels at the die of dice to drains,
the prowess of ankles to knee the prayer as an apron of fear,
the twilight logs to lumbering!!

Jobs and Market pricing Rank & Filed,
idea's gather touch Dust,
Time is a Schedule relative to Space!!

Galaxy Universe Cosmic,
the tune of billions of works,
artistry fathoms planets skirt.

Humanity ramps bridge to ask what is the Sky,
eggs with scrambling how does it Pi,
mathematic to the chorus of just only per lapse are methods that destruction did crest,
the explosive marrow of earth!!

Ride high my Founds as the stagger is a Sphere of hello ample is ecclesiastic,
chapter lives as each booking rounds,
up goes the cuddle to huge is the smile on the grins!!

Across thunder the Eyes,
sparkling as if the Oceans ran to the tiers!!

Hour bought our raft each particle said,
is this that fresh heir to speak a tacked,
harnessed by from in light is the laugh,
forest of darkness black and these by's,
this is the Times of Ages multiplied by the Moon and arrears!!

Reserve why while once upon the big Bam,
little known reason came land??,
neigh??,
knickers??,
presenting gifts to solid ground did the fashion addressing feat to beam,
Wares of Creation at now Evolution and jet^Teed!!

Taking Off to reach the Raise of Magical Film,
blinking with storms just to bank the creek easing the rivers runned,
valley often detail,
the Caves and the Sale,
however Mankind has Wined the glass as have fulled to glacier itself in Freeze!!

Frightened and Shiva,
the gods of Hell heave the Falls to announce Heaven at tribal,
the beat of a Trillion Drums on the Trumpets of horns,
can the civilization signed believe in The Sail's of Constellation priced,
or is each deep Tale soled for the bodies method of graves apron tunes??,
quest strong is to the accepting of faxed,
dirt the temple as mud gave the craft of crock at the hippo!!

To spell the aspect as yank.key would be so frost,
the World rots as this Country looks a day??,
these are the Paths that stone gave to foot plots??,
dialing Numbers scene,
guest among the filed,
an Oracle of Treat in-arson is our Start!!

Police Officer

Collin Rose

Wayne State University Police Department, Michigan

End of Watch: Wednesday, November 23, 2016

Police Officer Collin Rose succumbed to gunshot wound sustained the previous day while questioning a suspicious person near the university's downtown campus.

Officer Rose was in an area that had experienced numerous thefts from vehicles the previous day. He informed dispatchers that he was making contact with a suspicious person in front of 3650 Lincoln Street. During the encounter Officer Rose attempted to detain the man but the subject suddenly pulled out a gun and shot him in the head.

The subject fled the scene but was arrested later in the night.

Officer Rose had served with the Wayne State University Police Department for 5-1/2 years and served as a canine officer with the agency. He had previously served with the Richland Police Department.

Fire & brim stow^OWN the Skull shoulder thought,
sing with a twister as the sigh.clone wanders cross to straddle reservation,
chair.rib persons happen??,
snail's gently wain is reep.per's near.Lee chest.tour field??,
cause.Mick the taste off vernacular choice!!



Picture America Cross burnings and the Klu Klux Klan at their Reep,
rounding the hood to clothe their bodily raids,
in the mid black kit's gear to shift the burn,
did the fry scream,
does the ear of corn ripe to that stride of fried,
black.key tremble for the hands.Sup??,
how does the lives Matter??,
must be a fuzzy static on the line as organizations door the signed??,
what is the cyst.tour of the boil.lean lips of feather poured??


True threats
DAVID L. HUDSON JR.
FIRST AMENDMENT SCHOLAR
Monday, May 12, 2008
The First Amendment protects a wide swath of expression that many of us may find offensive, distasteful or even repugnant. The government cannot silence and punish speakers just because it dislikes their expression. Oftentimes, the First Amendment protects the flag-burner, the tobacco advertiser, the pornographer and the hateful speaker.
However, First Amendment jurisprudence has never provided absolute protection to all forms of speech. There are several unprotected categories of expression, including but not limited to fighting words, obscenity, extortion, perjury and false advertising. Another unprotected category is the true threat. The First Amendment does not give a person the right to walk up to someone else and say “I am going to kill you” or to announce in an airport, “I am going to bomb this plane.”
Yet the line between protected expression and an unprotected true threat is often hazy and uncertain. What if a speaker makes a seemingly threatening statement about a political figure through the use of hyperbole? What if a student says that if he receives a poor grade, he may “go Columbine”? What if an abortion protester talks about participating in a “war against abortionists”?
Supreme Court case law
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed a true-threat case in Watts v. United States (1969). Robert Watts, a young African-American man, allegedly stated during a protest in Washington D.C.:
“They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday morning. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
Prosecutors charged Watts with violating a federal law that prohibits threats against the president. Watts countered that his statement was a form of crude political opposition. A federal jury convicted Watts of a felony for violating the law and a federal appeals court affirmed his conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Watts’ statement was political hyperbole rather than a true threat.
“We agree with [Watts] that his only offense here was ‘a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President,’” the Court wrote in a per curiam opinion. “Taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.”
Unfortunately, the Court in Watts failed to define what constitutes a true threat. Other courts considering true-threats cases have focused on certain elements of Watts, including: (1) the fact that the comments were made accompanying a political debate; (2) the conditional nature of the threat; and (3) the context of the speech, as apparently several listeners laughed after Watts spoke.
The Supreme Court next addressed true threats, though not directly, in another case with connections to the civil rights movement. In NAACP. v. Claiborne Hardware (1982), the Court unanimously reversed a finding that Charles Evers and the NAACP could be found civilly liable for speech advocating the boycott of certain white-owned businesses. Evers, field secretary for the NAACP in Mississippi, had given impassioned speeches encouraging fellow African-Americans to participate in the boycott. He made some highly charged statements, such as “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”
The Court found that Evers’ comments did not constitute fighting words, incitement to imminent lawless action or a true threat. It concluded that “Evers’ addresses did not exceed the bounds of protected speech.” While most of the analysis centered on whether Evers’ speech incited imminent lawless action, the case added to the Watts legacy that charged political advocacy is unlikely to rise to the level of a true threat. Unfortunately, it provided little guidance for determining whether speech constitutes a true threat.
“Claiborne Hardware is one of the most difficult cases to analyze,” wrote Stanford Law Professor Jennifer Rothman in her incisive 2001 article, “Freedom of Speech and True Threats” for the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. “The decision itself is fairly opaque about its basis for determining that Evers’ speech did not constitute true threats.”
The high court more directly addressed true threats in a pair of Virginia cross-burning cases collectively known as Virginia v. Black(2003). One case involved a Ku Klux Klan leader named Barry Elton Black, who burned a cross in a field with the permission of the property owner. The other case involved two individuals who burned crosses in the yard of a neighboring African-American family. In separate cases that became consolidated, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a Virginia state law that prohibited “any person or group of persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place.”
Another provision of the law created a presumption that all cross-burnings were done with an intent to intimidate. In its decision, the Court upheld the bulk of the Virginia law, but invalidated the section that provided that all cross-burnings were presumed to be intimidating.
In deciding the case, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her plurality opinion offered a definition of true threats:
“‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”
She added, “intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”
Lack of clarity
Many legal experts say that the Supreme Court’s true-threat cases have failed to provide clear guidance for lower courts. Commentator Paul T. Crane in a 2006 Virginia Law Review article “True Threats and the Issue of Intent,” wrote that “in providing a definition, the Court created more confusion than elucidation” and “spawned as many questions as answers.” Duke law professor Steven Gey, in a 2005 article for the Notre Dame Law Review, “A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation and Free Speech,” said: “Justice O’Connor’s opinion in the cross burning case borders on the incoherent.”
Many lower courts have struggled with the Court’s decision in Black because it is unclear what level of intent is necessary for a speaker’s utterance to be considered a true threat. In other words, must a speaker subjectively intend to intimidate or threaten others? Or is it sufficient if the speaker makes a comment that a recipient reasonably believes is a threat? Should true threats be interpreted under a “reasonable speaker” or “reasonable recipient” standard? Is there a difference between a true threat and intimidation or is intimidation a special subset of the more general category of true threats?
Lower courts struggle to define true threats and apply the Court’s precedents from Watts and Black. Some courts have determined that in order for speech to constitute a true threat, the speaker must subjectively intend to threaten someone. This doesn’t mean that the speaker must actually intend to carry out the threat. It does mean, however, that the speaker must subjectively intend that his or her comments be interpreted as a true threat.
A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this view in United States v. Cassel (2005), a case involving a man who allegedly intimidated prospective buyers to dissuade them from purchasing a plot of land next to his own. Jury instructions in his case provided: “Intimidation is to make a person timid or fearful through the use of words and conduct that would put an ordinary, reasonable person in fear or apprehension for the purpose of compelling or deterring legal conduct of that person.”
For the 9th Circuit, the jury instructions were constitutionally deficient because they did not require the government to prove that the defendant made the comments with the intent to intimidate the prospective buyers.
However, other courts interpret Virginia v. Black as requiring only that the speaker knowingly intended to communicate to another person. These courts do not require that it be proven that the speaker subjectively intended to threaten someone. Rather, they focus on whether there was an intent to communicate and whether an objective or reasonable recipient would regard it as a serious expression of harm. For example, a three-judge panel of the 5th Circuit in Porter v. Ascension School District (2004) wrote:
“Speech is a true threat and therefore unprotected if an objectively reasonable person would interpret the speech as a serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm. The protected status of the threatening speech is not determined by whether the speaker had the subjective intent to carry out the threat; rather, to lose the protection of the First Amendment and be lawfully punished, the threat must be intentionally or knowingly communicated to either the object of the threat or a third person.”
Even courts that agree there is no subjective-intent requirement disagree over how to apply the objective requirement. Courts disagree whether the objective test should be applied from the perspective of a reasonable speaker (the person allegedly making the threat or who should have known that his words could be interpreted as threatening) or the reasonable recipient (the intended target). Some courts avoid the labeling of reasonable speaker or recipient and simply apply a reasonable-person standard.
Still other courts employ a multi-factor test to determine whether speech constitutes a true threat. In United States v. Dinwiddie (1996), the 8th Circuit examined whether an abortion protester engaged in making true threats in violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act (FACE). The court applied a test consisting of what came to be known as the “Dinwiddie factors”:
The reaction of the recipient of the threat and of other listeners.
Whether the threat was conditional.
Whether the threat was communicated directly to its victim.
Whether the maker of the threat had made similar statements to the victim in the past.
Whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence.
Conclusion
True-threat jurisprudence remains a muddled mess. Courts often have trouble determining whether violent expression should be evaluated under the “incitement to imminent lawless action” standard or under a true-threats line of analysis.
In a high-profile case involving a Web site known as the Nuremberg Files, which listed abortion providers with lines drawn through names if they were killed, a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit said Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) and its requirement of imminency must be applied. That is, a threat must be explicit and likely to cause “imminent lawless action.” The panel ruled that neither was the case and that the speech on the Web site was protected. But, the full panel of the 9th Circuit eventually ruled 6-5 that the case was more properly evaluated under true-threat analysis and that the Web site did in fact constitute a true threat. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review this ruling.
Lower courts are far from consistent in how they determine whether speech is truly threatening. Some courts interpret Supreme Court case law to require subjective intent, while others apply different versions of an “objective” test as some form of general intent to communicate.
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into the thickets of true threats in Virginia v. Black seemingly raises as many questions as it provides answers. Particularly interesting will be whether intimidation becomes a synonym for, or a subset of, true threats. It may take further clarification from the Supreme Court to resolve these thorny questions and provide more guidance on when speech crosses the line from protected speech into unprotected threats or intimidation.
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The First Amendment Center is an educational organization and cannot provide legal advice.

Ken Paulson is president of the First Amendment Center and dean of the College of Mass Communication at Middle Tennessee State University. He is also the former editor-in-chief of USA Today.


Gene Policinski, chief operating officer of the Newseum Institute, also is senior vice president of the First Amendment Center, a center of the institute. He is a veteran journalist whose career has included work in newspapers, radio, television and online.


John Seigenthaler founded the Newseum Institute’s First Amendment Center in 1991 with the mission of creating national discussion, dialogue and debate about First Amendment rights and values.


Dr. Charles C. Haynes is director of the Religious Freedom Center at the Newseum Institute.. He writes and speaks extensively on religious liberty and religion in American public life.


David L. Hudson Jr. is an expert in First Amendment issues and a regular contributor to the First Amendment Center's website. Hudson teaches law and was a scholar at the First Amendment Center.

Nunc tincidunt Proin dolor Aenean lacinia Aenean lacinia Aenean lacinia Aenean lacinia
• About the First Amendment
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We support the First Amendment and build understanding of its core freedoms through education, information and entertainment.

The center serves as a forum for the study and exploration of free-expression issues, including freedom of speech, of the press and of religion, and the rights to assemble and to petition the government.

Founded by John Seigenthaler, the First Amendment Center is an operating program of the Freedom Forum and is associated with the Newseum and the Diversity Institute. The center has offices in the John Seigenthaler Center at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tenn., and at the Newseum in Washington, D.C.

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The center’s website, www.firstamendmentcenter.org, is one of the most authoritative sources of news, information and commentary in the nation on First Amendment issues. It features daily updates on news about First Amendment-related developments, as well as detailed reports about U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the First Amendment, and commentary, analysis and special reports on free expression, press freedom and religious-liberty issues. Support the work of the First Amendment Center.


In death life grants this,
an fine planet of wrist to prep the mile of an inch for.rest style,
dress free.zone to look it is a grown,
whisper came to the voice of set Tolled,
purchase is a word to the legged.

Thursday, November 24, 2016

Description Is Warring With Society And What Was That Word, Social Dogma Has Content Of Rough Sketch Of Actus reus??


Fallen officer Benjamin Marconi, 50 years old and a 20-year veteran of the force is dead. Shot twice in the head late Sunday morning. Det. Benjamin Marconi was murdered. The execution of Det. Benjamin Marconi took place while writing a ticket out in his patrol car November 20, 2016 just outside of police headquarters. https://www.odmp.org/officer/23035-detective-benjamin-edward-marconi
Detective Marconi served with the San Antonio Police Department for 20 years. He is survived by his two children.


Digestion of what the News Media advertises,
the streets and forgetting the starts,
just stats on their mind is a society full to reams of blind to what made that sharp!!


Traveling the bell ring,
it is not liberty that bet my candor to this private note barrel,
it is the people whom ignorant words,
oh for the Ancient pine!!

Across the galaxy to land of this world of pours,
portion to ladle of the brains on lice,
infections at character are those shoulder pumping shoes??

Rounds tax the Circle??
wish at the star and know the Universe is at Watch too.

Be from and then ask what is a comb,
to brush painting on thousands of years,
plates.

Two New York City police officers are shot and killed in a brazen ambush in Brooklyn - The Washington Post

Continent to Ocean on the shards,
bones remain,
yet what of the yarn??

Threads are the skin that bank suits,
dressed for the fair of human again!!

Wainscot.

10/31/2016 at 1:26 PM



Feel that pulse to find a 'morrow while the audience of civilizations shield,
as I know of history and the breakaway it is that final wire??,
listen to the sound of the World,
denial hems to tuck the style!!

So ancient these days of mile core mile,
each galloping breath the steam of fog as people breathe,
from deep yard to mounting shore,
even sand acknowledges by rolling wave to shore a dial.

Television showing the warm-up to kneeled,
what is in that cream a tore read of pass at Flag and field of grassed,
is this a privacy of happened to clarify that dream or is it reality with only a scene,
are the toe's in wriggle is War on that fiddle??

Stream this video in my mind to why is the brain touching keen,
through and threw at application will this country skill askew to a ray^shin,
is martyr the known air on radio??

Wise would be Men to character more than a kept,
from what I have said in simple writes to what is left,
it is the clock in the sun that tells,
a time at place in hells kit^chins!!

Written by I, Karen A. Placek at 5:27 PM on 10/30/2016


Mens rea

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Mens rea (/ˈmɛnz ˈrə/Latin for "guilty mind"[1][2][3]) is the mental element of a crime. It is a necessary element of many crimes.
The standard common law test of criminal liability is expressed in the Latin phrase actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, i.e. "the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty". In jurisdictions with due process, there must be both actus reus ("guilty act") and mens rea for a defendant to be guilty of a crime (see concurrence). As a general rule, someone who acted without mental fault is not liable in criminal law. Exceptions are known as strict liability crimes.
In civil law, it is usually not necessary to prove a subjective mental element to establish liability for breach of contract or tort, for example. But if a tort is intentionally committed or a contract is intentionally breached, such intent may increase the scope of liabilityand the damages payable to the plaintiff.
In some jurisdictions, the terms mens rea and actus reus have been replaced by alternative terminology. In Australia, mens rea is now called "fault elements" or "mental elements" and actus reus is now called "physical elements" or "external elements". The point of the changes was to replace obscure Latin with simpler words.[4][5]

Levels of mens rea[edit]

Under the traditional common law, the guilt or innocence of a person relied upon whether he had committed the crime (actus reus), and whether he intended to commit the crime (mens rea). However, many modern penal codes have created levels of mens reacalled modes of culpability, which depend on the surrounding elements of the crime: the conduct, the circumstances, and the result, or what the Model Penal Code calls CAR (conduct, attendant circumstances, result). The definition of a crime is thus constructed using only these elements rather than the colorful language of mens rea:[6]
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
— 18 U.S.C. §1111 (traditional common law)
A person commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual
— portion of Texas Penal Code ch. 19 §19.02 (modern offense element)
The traditional common law definitions and the modern definitions approach the crime from different angles.
In the traditional common law approach, the definition includes:
  1. actus reus: unlawful killing of a human being;
  2. mens rea: malice aforethought.
Modern law approaches the analysis somewhat differently. Homicide is a "results" crime in that it forbids any "intentional" or "knowing" conduct that results in the death of another human being. "Intentional" in this sense means the actor possessed a "purpose" or "desire" that his or her objective (i.e. death of another human being) be achieved. "Knowing" means that the actor was aware or practically certain that the death would result. Thus, the actus reus and mens rea of homicide in a modern criminal statute can be considered as follows:
  1. actus reus: any conduct resulting in the death of another individual;
  2. mens rea: intent or knowledge that the conduct would result in the death.
In the modern approach, the attendant circumstances tend to replace the traditional mens rea, indicating the level of culpability as well as other circumstances. For example, the crime of theft of government property would include as an attendant circumstance that the property belong to the government.[6]

Modes of culpability[edit]

The levels of mens rea and the distinction between them vary between jurisdictions. Although common law originated from England, the common law of each jurisdiction with regard to culpability varies as precedents and statutes vary.

England and Wales[edit]

  • Direct intention: the actor has a clear foresight of the consequences of his actions, and desires those consequences to occur. It's his aim or purpose to achieve this consequence (death).
  • Oblique intention: the result is a virtually certain consequence or a 'virtual certainty' of the defendant's actions, and that the defendant appreciates that such was the case.[7][8][9]
  • Knowingly: the actor knows, or should know, that the results of his conduct are reasonably certain to occur.
  • Recklessness: the actor foresees that particular consequences may occur and proceeds with the given conduct, not caring whether those consequences actually occur or not.[10][11][12]
  • Criminal negligence: the actor did not actually foresee that the particular consequences would flow from his actions, but a reasonable person, in the same circumstances, would have foreseen those consequences.

Scotland[edit]

  • Intention: the accused willingly committed a criminal act entirely aware of his actions and their consequences. Necessary for murder and for assault.
  • Recklessness: the accused was aware the criminal act could be potentially dangerous but did not give a second thought to its consequences, for example involuntary culpable homicide.
  • Negligence: the accused unintentionally committed the criminal act by accident for one reason or another. However this tends not to be a valid excuse.

United States[edit]

State criminal law[edit]

The vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the United States are carried out by the component states in accordance with the laws of the state in question. Historically, the states (with the partial exception of civil-law Louisiana) applied common-law rules of mens rea similar to those extant in England, but over time American understandings of common-law mens rea terms diverged from those of English law and from each other. By the late 1950s to early 1960s, the common law of mens rea was widely acknowledged to be a slippery, vague, confused mess.[13] This was one of several factors that led to the development of the Model Penal Code.
Model Penal Code[edit]
Since its publication in 1957, the formulation of mens rea set forth in the Model Penal Code has been highly influential throughout North America in clarifying the discussion of the different modes of culpability.[13]
  • Strict liability: the actor engaged in conduct and his mental state is irrelevant. Under Model Penal Code Section 2.05, this mens rea may only be applied where the forbidden conduct is a mere violation, i.e. a civil infraction.
  • Negligently: a "reasonable person" would be aware of a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct is of a prohibited nature, will lead to a prohibited result, and/or is under prohibited attendant circumstances, and the human-individual was not so aware but should have been.
  • Recklessly: the human-individual consciously disregards a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" that his conduct is of a prohibited nature, will lead to a prohibited result, and/or is of a prohibited nature.
  • Knowingly: the human-individual is practically certain that his conduct will lead to the result, or is aware to a high probability that his conduct is of a prohibited nature, or is aware to a high probability that the attendant circumstances exist.
  • Purposefully: the human-individual has the "conscious object" of engaging in conduct and believes or hopes that the attendant circumstances exist.
Except for strict liability, these classes of mens rea are defined in Section 2.02(2) of the MPC.

Federal criminal law[edit]

As the federal government of the United States does not have a generalized police power like that of the states, the scope of its criminal statutes is necessarily circumscribed; ordinary prosecutions are the province of the states, and only crimes of special federal import are pursued by the federal government. Consequently, Title 18 of the United States Code does not have a culpability scheme but relies on more traditional definitions of crimes taken from common law. For example, malice aforethought is used as a requirement for committing capital murder.[14]

Canada[edit]

The Supreme Court of Canada has found that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees a minimum requirement for the mental state of various crimes. For example, the crime of murder must include a mental requirement of at least subjective foresight of death. For crimes where imprisonment is a sanction, there is a requirement of at least a defence of due diligence.

Australia[edit]

Mens rea needs to be proved by prosecution from offence to offence. If it is a common law offence, mens rea is found out by relevant precedent (DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182). Where the offence is in legislation, the requisite mens rea is found by interpreting the intention of the legislation (He Kaw Teh[15]). They must intend to commit the full offence. [16]

Ignorance of the law and mens rea[edit]

The general rule under common law is that "ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution."[17][18] In some cases, courts have held if knowledge of a law, or the intent to break a law, is a material element of an offense a defendant may use ignorance as a defense to willfulness if his misunderstanding is in good faith:
The proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. . . . [T]he Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory term "willfully" as used in federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception to the traditional rule."[19]
Crimes like tax evasion are specific intent crimes and require intent to violate the law as an element of the offense.[20] In R. v. Klundert, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal found as follows:
"[55] Section 239(1)(d) is part of an Act which is necessarily and notoriously complex. It is subject to ongoing revision. No lay person is expected to know all the complexities of the tax laws. It is accepted that people will act on the advice of professionals and that the advice will often turn on the meanings to be given to provisions in the Act that are open to various interpretations. Furthermore, it is accepted that one may legitimately structure one’s affairs so as to minimize tax liability. Considered in this legislative context, I have no difficulty in holding that a mistake or ignorance as to one’s liability to pay tax under the Act may negate the fault requirement in the provision, regardless of whether it is a factual mistake, a legal mistake, or a combination of both."
Not all offenses require specific intent, and a misreading, even in good faith, may not excuse the criminal conduct.[21] A good-faith belief that a law is unjust or unconstitutional is no excuse,[22] but "reasonable compliance upon an official statement of law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous" does not constitute a criminal act.[23]

Subjective and objective tests[edit]

The test for the existence of mens rea may be:
(a) subjective, where the court must be satisfied that the accused actually had the requisite mental element present in his or her mind at the relevant time (for purposely, knowingly, recklessly etc) (see concurrence);
(b) objective, where the requisite mens rea element is imputed to the accused, on the basis that a reasonable person would have had the mental element in the same circumstances (for negligence); or
(c) hybrid, where the test is both subjective and objective.
The court will have little difficulty in establishing mens rea if there is actual evidence – for instance, if the accused made an admissible admission. This would satisfy a subjectivetest. But a significant proportion of those accused of crimes make no such admissions. Hence, some degree of objectivity must be brought to bear as the basis upon which to impute the necessary component(s). It is always reasonable to assume that people of ordinary intelligence are aware of their physical surroundings and of the ordinary laws of cause and effect (see causation). Thus, when a person plans what to do and what not to do, he will understand the range of likely outcomes from given behaviour on a sliding scale from "inevitable" to "probable" to "possible" to "improbable". The more an outcome shades towards the "inevitable" end of the scale, the more likely it is that the accused both foresaw and desired it, and, therefore, the safer it is to impute intention. If there is clear subjective evidence that the accused did not have foresight, but a reasonable person would have, the hybrid test may find criminal negligence. In terms of the burden of proof, the requirement is that a jury must have a high degree of certainty before convicting, defined as "beyond a reasonable doubt" in the United States and "sure" in the United Kingdom.[24][25][26] It is this reasoning that justifies the defenses of infancy, and of lack of mental capacity under the M'Naghten Rules, an alternate common law rule (e.g., Durham test), and one of various statutes defining mental illness as an excuse. Moreover, if there is an irrebuttable presumption of doli incapax - that is, that the accused did not have sufficient understanding of the nature and quality of his actions – then the requisite mens rea is absent no matter what degree of probability might otherwise have been present.[27] For these purposes, therefore, where the relevant statutes are silent and it is for the common law to form the basis of potential liability, the reasonable person must be endowed with the same intellectual and physical qualities as the accused, and the test must be whether an accused with these specific attributes would have had the requisite foresight and desire.
In English law, s8 Criminal Justice Act 1967 provides a statutory framework within which mens rea is assessed. It states:[28]
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offense,
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reasons only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.
Under s8(b) therefore, the jury is allowed a wide latitude in applying a hybrid test to impute intention or foresight (for the purposes of recklessness) on the basis of all the evidence.

Relevance of motive[edit]

One of the mental components often raised in issue is that of motive. If the accused admits to having a motive consistent with the elements of foresight and desire, this will add to the level of probability that the actual outcome was intended (it makes the prosecution case more credible). But if there is clear evidence that the accused had a different motive, this may decrease the probability that he or she desired the actual outcome. In such a situation, the motive may become subjective evidence that the accused did not intend, but was reckless or willfully blind.[citation needed]
Motive cannot be a defense. If, for example, a person breaks into a laboratory used for the testing of pharmaceuticals on animals, the question of guilt is determined by the presence of an actus reus, i.e. entry without consent and damage to property, and a mens rea, i.e. intention to enter and cause the damage. That the person might have had a clearly articulated political motive to protest such testing does not affect liability. If motive has any relevance, this may be addressed in the sentencing part of the trial, when the court considers what punishment, if any, is appropriate.[citation needed]

Intention[edit]

Main article: Intention (criminal law)

Recklessness (United States: "willful blindness")[edit]

Main articles: Recklessness (law) and Willful blindness
In such cases, there is clear subjective evidence that the accused foresaw but did not desire the particular outcome. When the accused failed to stop the given behavior, he took the risk of causing the given loss or damage. There is always some degree of intention subsumed within recklessness. During the course of the conduct, the accused foresees that he may be putting another at risk of injury: A choice must be made at that point in time. By deciding to proceed, the accused actually intends the other to be exposed to the risk of that injury. The greater the probability of that risk maturing into the foreseen injury, the greater the degree of recklessness and, subsequently, sentence rendered. For example, at common law, an unlawful homicide committed recklessly would ordinarily constitute the crime of voluntary manslaughter. One committed with "extreme" or "gross"recklessness as to human life would constitute murder, sometimes defined as "depraved heart" or "abandoned and malignant heart" murder.[29]

Criminal negligence[edit]

Main article: Criminal negligence
Here, the test is both subjective and objective. There is credible subjective evidence that the particular accused neither foresaw nor desired the particular outcome, thus potentially excluding both intention and recklessness. But a reasonable person with the same abilities and skills as the accused would have foreseen and taken precautions to prevent the loss and damage being sustained. Only a small percentage of offences are defined with this mens rea requirement. Most legislatures prefer to base liability on either intention or recklessness and, faced with the need to establish recklessness as the default mens rea for guilt, those practising in most legal systems rely heavily on objective tests to establish the minimum requirement of foresight for recklessness.